Reverse
Takeovers: A shell game
by Ian Rowley
Make
no mistake—reverse takeovers might seem like a handy way to
get a stockmarket listing, but they can be devilishly difficult.
Ian
Rowley
When
Integration, a £4.7m (E7.7m) privately owned UK computer-services
company, began looking for additional funding for its fast-growing
application service provider (ASP) business last summer, it
hit a wall.
First,
the company decided against turning to venture capital for fear
of losing management control. Second, and perhaps more important,
an initial public offering was out of the question as technology
stocks continued their freefall.
Then
executives at Integration took a look at reverse takeovers.
Though the notion is not new, reverse takeovers—where private
firms acquire listed companies—are attracting interest in many
business circles. One of the main drivers is the shakeout in
the dot-com sector. The idea is that failing dot-coms that have
floated can woo potential buyers with the prospect of rapid
access to a stock listing. The buyer also has access to the
dot-com’s liquid assets. But reverse takeovers aren’t just used
for dot-coms.
At Integration, Eamus Halpin, its chief executive, opted to
do a reverse takeover of SEP Industrial Holdings, a struggling
old economy producer of metal holders and fasteners, which had
floated in London in the late 1980s. “After looking at the deal
in great detail, we signed exclusivity in December,” says Halpin,
at which point SEP’s shares were suspended until the deal was
finalised, subject to shareholder approval, in late June.
Timely advice
The deal—which lets Integration acquire SEP’s stockmarket listing
and its £1.4m cash balances—is valued at £15.5m. The combined
company, now called iRevolution, is also raising £9.3m net of
expenses by issuing new stock.
But while reversing into a cash shell may seem attractive at
first glance, investment experts warn that they can be tricky.
They note that reverse takeovers are at least as time consuming
as an IPO and usually more complex. “A reverse takeover can
take anything from six to nine months to complete,” says John
Harley, global head of technology, media and telecoms for the
corporate finance group at Ernst & Young. “You have to effectively
re-list the company.”
So as the reverse buyer is taking care of the due diligence
on the shell company, it will also have to begin channelling
much of the information required for an IPO—such as both companies’
profit histories—to stock-exchange authorities and produce a
prospectus.
Chris Prevett, Integration’s finance director, concedes that
he was surprised by the amount of time that a reverse takeover
takes. “The quantity of disclosure required is out of this world,”
he says.
Others who have attempted reverse takeovers would second that.
Executives at Microboss, a German technology group, got a big
jolt after getting some harsh news from Deutsche Börse in January
this year. Authorities at the exchange reminded them that they
would first have to fulfil the same requirements as any other
company going through an IPO if the firm went ahead with a planned
reverse takeover of Gigabell, an online dating agency with a
listing on Germany’s Neuer Markt. By February, Microboss and
Gigabell decided to go their separate ways.
Meeting exchange requirements isn’t the only challenge, of course.
“There are lots of potential difficulties,” says Philip Kendall,
head of the PLC advisory at PricewaterhouseCoopers. Notably,
companies considering reversing into a listed firm should look
carefully at the profile of the shell’s shareholders. Kendall
notes that private investors often dominate a shell’s investor
base, particularly if institutions sold out when the business
began running into trouble. “The last thing you want is 3,000
penny investors,” he says. (Halpin says that isn’t the case
with Integration’s deal, noting that SEP’s shareholders are
predominantly institutional.)
Then there is the same host of post-deal integration issues
typical of traditional takeovers that must be addressed. For
example, he notes, “there are two sets of management teams and
you’ve got to get rid of one of them”.
According to Integration’s Prevett, its deal hit another speed
bump. SEP needed time to turn its assets into cash. Over its
20-year history, SEP had built up a range of capital-intensive
subsidiaries, most of which had to be liquidated before the
deal with Integration could go ahead. “We wanted to make sure
we were reversing into a very clean company,” he says, noting
that it took SEP until the end of March to sell most of the
business divisions, such as Component Industries, which was
liquidated via a management buyout for £4.5m. “If you’ve got
a clean cash shell [at the outset] that speeds up the whole
process,” Prevett adds.
Despite the drawbacks of reverse takeovers, Integration’s Halpin
reckons that there will be more of them in the coming months—particularly
as failing dot-com companies with sizeable cash reserves seek
new futures as shell companies.
“The reason I think we haven’t seen many deals happening so
far is because it takes a while to be turned into a shell,”
he says. “To do that properly takes time.”
And, if Integration’s transaction is any guide, a lot of hard
work.
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